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Pro and Contra Hilbert:
Zermelo’s Set Theories∗
Volker Peckhaus
Universität Paderborn
Résumé : Les recherches de Zermelo sur la théorie des ensembles et les fon-
dements des mathématiques se divisent en deux périodes : de 1901 à 1910
et de 1927 à 1935. Elles s’effectuent en même temps que les deux projets de
recherche sur les fondements des mathématiques de David Hilbert et de ses
collaborateurs à Göttingen ; durant la première période, Hilbert élaborait son
premier programme d’axiomatisation, auquel Zermelo souscrivait totalement.
La seconde période correspond au développement du programme formaliste de
Hilbert que Zermelo rejette en raison de son caractère finitiste. son travail est
à cette époque dirigé contre Hilbert.
Abstract: Zermelo’s research on set theory and the foundations of mathe-
matics was concentrated in two periods: 1901 to 1910 and 1927 to 1935. They
correspond to two specific periods of research on the foundations of mathe-
matics by David Hilbert and his collaborators in Göttingen. In the first period
Hilbert elaborated his early axiomatic program, and Zermelo’s work is clearly
along the lines proposed by Hilbert, it is pro Hilbert. The second period falls
into the time when Hilbert developed his proof-theory which was, because of
its finitistic character, flatly rejected by Zermelo. His work at that time was
contra Hilbert.
∗I would like to thank Christian Thiel (Erlangen), Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus
(Freiburg i. Br.), and Geoﬀrey Hellman (Minneapolis) for valuable comments and
corrections.
Philosophia Scientiæ, cahier spécial 5, 2005, 199–215.
200 Volker Peckhaus
1 Introduction
On 27 July 1941 Ernst Zermelo celebrated his 70th birthday. On this oc-
casion he received congratulations from Paul Bernays, his former student
and collaborator, who was at that time Privatdozent at the Eidgenössi-
sche Technische Hochschule in Zurich. In his response, dated 1 October
1941, Zermelo wrote:
I’m very glad about the fact that still some of my former colleagues and
collaborators remember me, while I have lost several of my friends by death.
One just becomes more and more lonely, is therefore the more grateful for
any friendly remembrance. [ . . . ] Of course, I have no illusions anymore
about the effects of my essential life’s work as it concerns “foundations” and
set theory. As far as my name is mentioned at all, this is always done only
in respect to the “principle of choice” for which I never claimed priority.1
As evidence Zermelo referred to a recent congress on foundations at
Zurich, most likely the congress “Les fondements et la méthode des
sciences mathématiques” in December 1938 [Gonseth 1941], where none
of his papers published after 1904, namely both notes in the Annalen
der Mathematik of 1908 and both papers published in the Fundamenta
Mathematicae in 1930 and 1935, had been mentioned, as he observed,
whereas “the dubious merits of a Skolem or Gödel were spinned out
pretty much.” In this letter, Zermelo also remembered the convention of
the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung at Bad Elster almost ten years
before in September 1931, where his lecture “had been excluded from dis-
cussion because of an intrigue of the Vienna school represented by [Hans]
Hahn and [Kurt] Gödel. Since then,” he continued, “I have lost any de-
sire to lecture on foundations. This is obviously the fate of everyone who
is not backed by a ‘school’ or clique.”2 Zermelo closed: “But maybe the
time will come when my work will be rediscovered and read again.” This
last remark sounds strange for our ears, I’m sure for Bernays’ ears as
well. Zermelo was a legend already during his lifetime. Today and also
at that time his name was connected to the big debate on the axiom of
choice used by Zermelo in 1904 for the proof of the well-ordering theo-
rem. He was responsible for the axiomatization of set theory presented
in 1908, which helped to establish set theory as a widely accepted math-
ematical theory. Today Zermelo’s name is omnipresent in set theory in
acronyms like “ZF” or “ZFC”.
1Zermelo to Bernays, dated Freiburg, 1 October 1941, Bernays Papers, ETH
Library Zurich, Hs. 975.5259.
2On the controversy between Gödel and Zermelo cf. [Moore 2002], on the events
in Bad Elster, ibid., 57–61.
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But Zermelo was more than the founder of axiomatized set theory.
With his application of set theory to the theory of chess, he became one
of the founders of game theory, and with his application of the calculus
of variations to the problem of the navigation of aircrafts he pioneered
navigation theory. With his recurrence objection in kinetic gas theory he
annoyed Ludwig Boltzmann, and with a translation of Homer’s Odyssee
he pleased even philology experts. In short: Zermelo was famous in his
time. Why this resigned self-assessment?
This paper tries to give a partial answer to this question. It sur-
veys the diﬀerent stages of Ernst Zermelo’s considerations on set theory
and philosophy of mathematics. It focusses on ontological and semanti-
cal aspects and compares them with David Hilbert’s conceptions. This
development is seen in the context of Zermelo’s biography and his un-
successful fate in academia.
2 Biographical Sketch
Zermelo’s development as an academic teacher and researcher can be
called a “scientiﬁc career” only with irony.3 He was born in Berlin on 27
July 1871. He studied mathematics, physics, and philosophy at Berlin,
Halle and Freiburg, ﬁnally graduating in Berlin in 1894 with a disser-
tation on the calculus of variations supervised by Hermann Amandus
Schwarz [Zermelo 1894]. His main working ﬁelds were applied math-
ematics and theoretical physics, an interest which he kept all his life
long. From 1894 to 1897 he worked as an assistant to Max Planck at the
Institute of Theoretical Physics in Berlin.
In 1897 he moved to Göttingen where he made his Habilitation in
applied mathematics in 1899, and subsequently taught as a Privatdozent
and eventually Titularprofessor, ﬁnanced by grants, since 1908 by a re-
muneration for the ﬁrst German lectureship for mathematical logic, and
students’ fees. Under the inﬂuence of David Hilbert he converted his
main working ﬁeld to set theory and the foundations of mathematics.
In 1910 he was appointed to a full professorship for mathematics at
the University of Zurich. Already in Göttingen he had fallen ill with
tuberculosis, a disease which made him ﬁnally incapable to fulﬁl his
teaching duties. As result of this he was not tenured after six years, and
had to retire in 1916. From then on he lived mainly from the pension he
got from the Zurich education department.
3On Zermelo’s biography cf. [Moore 1982], [Peckhaus 1990a], [Peckhaus 1990b,
ch. 4].
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In 1921 he moved back to Germany taking residence in the Black
Forrest near Freiburg. There he was “discovered” by the Freiburg math-
ematicians Lothar Heﬀter and Alfred Loewy. They initiated Zermelo’s
appointment to a honorary professorship at the University of Freiburg
(it was not connected to any revenues besides students’ fees). Zermelo
taught at Freiburg University until 1935 when he was dismissed due to a
denunciation for not having presented “Hitler’s salute” properly. He was
rehabilitated after the War, but, ill and almost blind, he never taught
again. Zermelo died on 21 May 1953 in Freiburg, survived by his wife
Gertrud, who died in 2003 at the age of 101.
This was in fact no career, of course. Only between 1910 and 1916
Zermelo got an oﬃcial salary. Besides this period of six years his revenues
consisted in grants, student’s fees and ﬁnally for 37 years the pension he
received from the Cantonal Government in Switzerland.
3 Two Periods of Research
Zermelo’s research on set theory and the foundations of mathematics
was concentrated in two periods: 1901 to 1910 and 1927 to 1935. They
correspond to two speciﬁc periods of research on the foundations of math-
ematics by David Hilbert and his collaborators in Göttingen. In the ﬁrst
period Hilbert elaborated his early axiomatic programme, and Zermelo’s
work is clearly along the lines proposed by Hilbert, it is pro Hilbert. The
second period falls into the time when Hilbert developed his proof-theory
which was, because of its ﬁnitistic character, ﬂatly rejected by Zermelo.
His work at that time was contra Hilbert.
3.1 The First Period
The two main topics of Hilbert’s foundational considerations during the
ﬁrst period were modern axiomatics and attempts to decide Cantor’s
continuum hypothesis.
Usually the story of Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics is written
starting with his seminal Grundlagen der Geometrie [Hilbert 1899], not
really a book on method, but the application of a method, the axiomatic
method, to Euclidean geometry.4 Nevertheless, with this book modern
axiomatics was created. Hilbert proceeded from three imagined systems
4For the prehistory and development cf. [Toepell 1999].
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of things (points, straight lines, planes) which he called, using the Kan-
tian term, “thought things”. He then described their interrelations in
a set of 20 axioms. In addition he investigated this set of axioms as
an object in itself, proving its completeness, the independence of the
axioms, and its consistency. The latter proof was done by reducing
the consistency of the geometrical axioms to the presupposed consis-
tency of arithmetic. Therefore, a complete consistency proof was in
fact postponed, and, at the same time, a new task was set: to ﬁnd a
consistent set of axioms for arithmetic. Hilbert presented his ideas con-
cerning the foundations of arithmetic in September 1899, at the annual
meeting of the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung which took place at
Munich. In his lecture “Über den Zahlbegriﬀ” [Hilbert 1900a] he elabo-
rated the foundations of arithmetic—in his opinion the basic discipline
of mathematics—independently of set-theoretic considerations. Due to
the sketchy character of this paper, Hilbert did not carry out the meta-
axiomatic investigations on independence of the axioms, completeness of
the system and its consistency. Concerning the “necessary task” to prove
consistency, he asserted, “only a suitable modiﬁcation of known methods
of inference” [Hilbert 1900a, 184] was required. These optimistic words
from September 1899 seem to indicate that Hilbert probably underesti-
mated the enormity of the task in hand. He soon changed his views. In
August 1900, less than one year later, he included the consistency proof
for arithmetic as the second among his famous mathematical problems
which he presented to the Second International Congress of Mathemati-
cians at Paris [Hilbert 1900b]. Three years later, on 27 October 1903,
he again emphasized the distinguished rôle of the consistency proof in
a lecture delivered before the Göttingen Mathematical Society on the
foundations of arithmetic. Following the report, it was Hilbert’s aim “to
work out the ‘axiomatic’ standpoint clearly”. On the rôle of consistency,
he then coined the brief formula: “the principle of contradiction the pièce
de résistance.”5
In Hilbert’s opinion around the turn of the century, set theory was
not the basic foundation of mathematics. Nevertheless, he was interested
in set theory, as a mathematical theory. This becomes evident in his
correspondence with Georg Cantor between 1897 and 1900.
The main topic of this exchange of letters were Cantor’s problems
with the assumption of the set of all cardinals. Already in the ﬁrst of
Cantor’s letters to Hilbert, dated 26 September 1897 [Cantor 1991, no.
156, 388–389], Cantor proves that the totality of alephs does not exist,
5Cf. the report in Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung 12
(1903), 592.
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i. e., that this totality is no well-deﬁned, ready set (fertige Menge). If
it is taken to be a ready set, a certain larger aleph would follow on this
totality. So this new aleph would at the same time belong to the totality
of all alephs, and not belong to it, because of being larger than all alephs
[Cantor 1991, 388].
Although this is a negative existence proof, the feature discussed was
later called “Cantor’s Paradox”, i. e., the paradox of the greatest cardinal,
or of the set of all cardinals. We have evidence that it was during his dis-
cussions with Cantor that Hilbert formulated a paradox of his own, later
known in Göttingen as “Hilbert’s Paradox” [Peckhaus & Kahle 2002],
and ﬁrst written down in Hilbert’s unpublished lecture course Logische
Principien des mathematischen Denkens presented to his Göttingen stu-
dents in the summer semester of 1905.6 Hilbert considered this paradox,
resulting from the set-formation principles of union and self-mapping, as
“purely mathematical” because he carefully avoided using any concept
from transﬁnite arithmetic. It is this paradox Hilbert referred to in his
letter to Gottlob Frege of 7 November 1903 after having received the
second volume of Frege Grundgesetze der Arithmetik containing Frege’s
admission that the logical system used there for the foundation of arith-
metic had proved to be inconsistent. In this letter Hilbert referred to
Frege’s description of Russell’s paradox in the postscript, and wrote that
“this example” was already known in Göttingen. In a footnote he added
“I believe Dr Zermelo discovered it three or four years ago after I had
communicated my examples to him.”7 This quote gives evidence for a
discourse between Hilbert and Zermelo on set theory that must have
taken place already before the turn of the century. The quotation also
indicates, however, that the revolutionary impact of the paradoxes was
not seen in Göttingen before their eﬀect on Frege’s logic had become
evident. Hilbert’s early solution of Cantor’s and his own paradox as
presented in “Über den Zahlbegriﬀ” [Hilbert 1900a] and in the Paris
problems lecture was simply to apply the axiomatic method to set the-
ory. If the consistency proof for the axioms was successful, the existence
of the totality of real numbers would have been shown at the same time,
and the existence of the totality of all powers or of all Cantorian alephs
could be disproved [Hilbert 1900a, 184]. Hilbert clearly saw the connec-
tions with the continuum problem which he listed in 1900 as the ﬁrst of
his “Mathematical Problems.”
Besides Zermelo’s involvement in the early discussion on the forma-
tion of unintended sets, what were his contributions in the framework of
6[Hilbert 1905c]. For an analysis see [Peckhaus 1990b, 58–72].
7[Frege 1980, 51]; German original [Frege 1976, 79–80].
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Hilbertian foundational research in this ﬁrst period?
Already in the winter semester 1900/01 he gave a course on set the-
ory in Göttingen.8 In 1902 he published a ﬁrst paper on the addition of
transﬁnite cardinals [Zermelo 1902]. In August 1904 he disproved Julius
König’s rejection of the continuum hypothesis in the discussions at the
Third International Congress of Mathematicians in Heidelberg.9 One
month later he communicated to Hilbert in a letter that he was able
to prove the well-ordering theorem, which Hilbert had named “the key
for proving the continuum hypothesis” in the Paris problems lecture.
The proof was subsequently published in the Mathematische Annalen
almost immediately [Zermelo 1904], keeping the letter form. It evoked
a storm of protest in the mathematical community, above all directed
against Zermelo’s use of the principle of choice [Moore 1982]. He re-
acted by publishing a new proof in 1908 together with a rejection of the
main criticisms which was in parts very polemical [Zermelo 1908a]. In
the same year Zermelo published an axiom system of set theory accord-
ing to Hilbert’s model [Zermelo 1908b], sharing Hilbert’s opinion that a
“deepening of foundations” of a mathematical discipline was necessary as
soon as this discipline was questioned because of foundational problems.
That this situation was given for set theory because of the paradoxes
was well known in Göttingen, at least in 1908.
As mentioned earlier, Zermelo followed Hilbert’s suggestions concern-
ing the structure of axiomatic systems. Zermelo only mentions, however,
the necessity of proving the consistency of his axioms. He did not carry
this proof out, although he had intended to add such proof as becomes
evident from his correspondence with Hilbert. He stopped his research
because Hilbert urged him to publish his results.10 As we know today,
a wise decision.
But Zermelo did not work exclusively in set theory! After the signiﬁ-
cance of the paradoxes had been understood in Göttingen, a new ﬁeld of
research was opened: logic. It then became evident that a consistency
proof for arithmetic could not be found by slightly revising existing meth-
ods of inference, as Hilbert initially had assumed [Hilbert 1900a, 184].
It is, namely, pointless to rely on inferences based on a logic which had
recently been proved to be inconsistent. First attempts of creating a
8Cf. the notebook with the manuscript of this course (partially in shorthand)
in the Zermelo papers, University Archives (UA), Freiburg i. Br., C 129/150. For a
discussion cf. [Moore 1982, 155–156].
9For a report on this incident cf. [Kowalewski 1950, 198–203].
10On Zermelo’s attempts to proof the consistency of his axiom system, cf. his letter
to Hilbert, dated Arosa, 25 March 1907, Hilbert papers, Staats- und Universitätsbib-
liothek Göttingen, Cod. Ms D. Hilbert 447, fol. 5.
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new logic for his projects had been made by Hilbert himself in 1905, in
the paper “Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik” [Hilbert
1905a], and elaborated in the lecture course on the logical principles of
mathematical thought. Zermelo then took over the task of creating log-
ical competence in Göttingen with his lecture course on mathematical
logic in the summer semester of 1908, the ﬁrst one based on an oﬃcial
assignment.11
There are furthermore indications that in this period Zermelo fol-
lowed Hilbert’s idealistic attitude towards mathematical objects. As
mentioned earlier, Hilbert regarded mathematical objects as “thought
things”, creations of the mind whose ontological status was simply left
open. Existence of mathematical objects was seen as their consistent
possibility within given theories. Hilbert’s “ontology” is therefore with-
out any realistic commitment. Hilbert style axiomatics of the pre-war
era was epistemologically and ontologically neutral.
This attitude of keeping epistemological and ontological questions
open was shared by Zermelo. He started the axiomatization of set the-
ory in set theory itself as it was historically given. He then attempted
“establishing the principles which are necessary to found this mathemat-
ical discipline” [Zermelo 1908a, 261]. The methodological tool he used
was thus regressive analysis [Peckhaus 2002]. The principles had to be
restricted in such a way that all paradoxes could be avoided, but they
had to be wide enough to retain everything of value in set theory. Zer-
melo mentioned the necessity of investigating the independence of the
axioms, but concerning deeper philosophical considerations he remarked:
“The further, more philosophical, question about the origin of these prin-
ciples and the extent to which they are valid will not be discussed here”
([Zermelo 1908a, 262]; transl. 200). However, Zermelo obviously did not
follow the ideology often connected with the modern axiomatic method
according to which it helped to solve all philosophical problems of math-
ematics within mathematics itself, as claimed, e. g., by Paul Bernays
[Bernays 1922, 94]. Zermelo, like Hilbert, simply avoided dealing with
philosophical problems.
What Zermelo did, in fact, was to keep the philosophical impact on
mathematics to a minimum. For the mathematician doing mathematics
it is of no use to know whether the mathematical objects he is operating
with have any real analogue, whether the signs he uses have a real world
reference, or whether his statements are true in a referential sense. He is
interested in the question whether his operations are possible, i. e., he is
11[Zermelo 1908c]; cf. [Peckhaus 1990b, 106–116]; [Peckhaus 1990a], [Peckhaus
1992], [Peckhaus 1994].
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looking for a guarantee that his axioms do not imply any contradiction.
Again the questions whether or not mathematical objects have real ex-
istence, whether or not mathematical theorems are true, are left open.
It is simply assumed that the objects exist and that the theorems are
true, as if the philosophical justiﬁcation had already been given. The
axioms are thus stipulated as hypotheses, and the axiom system on their
basis is a hypothetico-deductive system. This position was introduced
by Mario Pieri [Marchisotto 1993, 292], and taken over by Zermelo in
his 1908 lecture course on mathematical logic.
Zermelo starts his logic course with considerations on the nature of
mathematical judgements, especially the question whether arithmetical
statements are analytic or synthetic. He opposes Frege, Peano and Rus-
sell on the “analytic side” with Poincaré on the “synthetic side”, but
refuses to decide on one of the factions. He prefers to hold a mediating
position [Zermelo 1908c, 3]. “We initially assume that synthetic and ana-
lytic judgements occur side by side in arithmetic and make it our business
to isolate the analytical part.” Zermelo now introduces a method which
he calls “analytical reduction” which, as he says, goes back to Euclid (or,
to be more exact, to Pappus of Alexandria), but was perfected in then
recent times by Hilbert:
This method consists in completely taking apart the proof of a theorem
into syllogisms, and in completely anteposing all premisses used in the
proof. One can now assert these premisses categorically, include them as
hypotheses into the theorem. We can say, however: in general, mathemati-
cal statements are not yet analytical judgements, but we are able to reduce
them to analytical judgements by hypothetical addition of synthetic pre-
misses. The logically reduced mathematical theorems emerging in this way
are analytical-hypothetical judgements and they form the logical skeleton
of a mathematical theory.
Mathematical deductions are thus independent of the truth of their ini-
tial statements. It is not the task of a mathematician to determine the
truth of the axioms.
3.2 The Second Period
The second period is characterized by the so-called foundational crisis
between intuitionism and formalism released not by the two protago-
nists of these positions, L. E. J. Brouwer and David Hilbert, but set into
being by Hermann Weyl’s paper on the new foundational crisis of mathe-
matics [Weyl 1921], thus constituting a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Hilbert’s
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answer to Brouwer’s criticism of the use of the law of the excluded mid-
dle in inﬁnite domains was the creation of meta-mathematics or proof
theory [Hilbert 1922]. Proof theory is no proper mathematics, but the
investigation of methods used in proofs, and aiming especially at a ﬁnite
justiﬁcation of means which can be used to deal with inﬁnite domains.
In this second period we ﬁnd Zermelo in a less isolated situation
than in the years after his dismissal from the Zurich professorship. After
having been called to the honorary professorship in Freiburg, he took
part in the mathematical life in Freiburg, and started to publish again,
supported and motivated by a funding from the Emergency Community
of German Science, the precursor of the German Research Foundation
(DFG), for a project entitled “Nature and Foundations of Pure and Ap-
plied Mathematics, and the Meaning of the Inﬁnite in Mathematics”
which helped him to improve his income between 1929 and 1931.12 Zer-
melo’s investigations resulted in three fundamental papers on cumula-
tive hierarchies of sets and inﬁnitary languages ([Zermelo 1930], [Zermelo
1932a], [Zermelo 1935]). A fresh impetus to his research was furthermore
given by a lecture tour of four months through Poland where he was able
to discuss his new ideas on the foundations of set theory. In a report
for the Emergency Community from December 1930 he commented on
his rather late entering the debate on the foundational crisis in mathe-
matics, the struggle between Hilbert and Brouwer. He stressed that he
had started research on foundations 30 years before under the inﬂuence
of David Hilbert, “to whom I owe the most in my scientiﬁc develop-
ment,” and that his contributions found a preliminary conclusion with
his axiomatization of set theory which essentially remained deﬁnitive in
axiomatic research in set theory. “In the meantime,” he continued,
the question of “foundations” got going again by the somewhat noisy ap-
pearance of the “intuitionists” who proclaimed a “foundational crisis” in
mathematics in impetuous pamphlets and declared war on so to say the
whole of modern science—without being able to put anything better at its
place. One of its most officious adepts decreed “A set theory as a special
mathematical discipline will not exist any more” while at the same time the
new text books of set theory run to leaf. This state of affairs prompted me
at that time to redirect my research activities to foundational problems,
after having been almost alienated from scientific production by a lengthy
illness and mental isolation abroad. Without becoming a party liner in
this proclaimed dispute between “intuitionism” and “formalism”—I think
that this alternative is an application of the “tertium non datur” which is
12Cf. UA Freiburg, C 129/40. Zermelo’s report for the Emergency Community of
German Science was published by Gregory H. Moore [Moore 1980, 130–134].
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logically inadmissable, anyway—I believed to be able to contribute to a
clarification of the relevant questions.13
No doubt, the most important of these contributions was Zermelo’s paper
“On Boundary Numbers and Domains of Sets: New Investigations in the
Foundations of Set Theory”, published in 1930, which he described in a
letter to the Warsaw mathematician Władisław Sierpiński14 as dealing
with the foundations of set theory and promising
to give a satisfactory clarification of the so-called antinomies [ . . . ]. It con-
cerns the investigation of such “domains of sets”, in which the general ax-
ioms of set theory are satisfied, and the systematic development of their,
essentially different (not isomorphic) “models” which can serve as their rep-
resentations.
In this pioneering work Zermelo anticipated the recent modal structural-
ism inspired by Hilary Putnam [Putnam 1967] and elaborated by Geof-
frey Hellman [Hellman 1989]. Its essential result is, as Hellman put it
[Hellman 1989, 55–56]: “Set theory should be seen, not as the theory of
a unique, all-embracing, but instead as a theory of an endless inﬁnity of
intimately related structures.”
Zermelo suggests an axiomatization that he himself calls “ZF system”
for “Zermelo-Fraenkel system,”15 and which he enlarges to the “supple-
mented ZF system” ZF ′ by adding the axiom of foundation.
The paper can be regarded as a delayed, and in the beginning uncon-
scious, rejoinder to Thoralf Skolem’s criticism of his ﬁrst axiomatization
of set theory [Skolem 1923].16 This criticism concerned above all the
axiom of separation according to which for every deﬁnite class state-
ment E(x) for a set M there is a subset N of M which contains those
elements x of M for which E(x) is true [Zermelo 1908b]. The notion of
deﬁniteness used in this formulation became controversial subsequently
because it was introduced by Zermelo in an informal way. According to
him a statement is called “deﬁnite” if one can decide about its validity or
13UA Freiburg C 129/140; [Moore 1980, 131].
14Zermelo to Sierpiński, dated Freiburg, 26 March 1930, UA Freiburg, C 129/100.
On this paper cf. Michael Hallett’s introduction [Hallett 1996] to its English transla-
tion, and furthermore [Lavine 1994, 134–141]; [Moore 1980, 120–130]; [Moore 1987,
125–128]; [Kanamori 1996, 26–29]; and [Ebbinghaus 2002].
15Today this system is “ZFC” (with “C” for “[axiom of] choice”) because the axiom
of choice is presupposed by Zermelo as a “general logical principle” [Zermelo 1930,
31].
16On the relation between Skolem and Zermelo, especially on the chronology of
Zermelo’s reactions to “Skolemism” see [van Dalen & Ebbinghaus 2000], [Ebbinghaus
2002].
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invalidity “without arbitrariness” with the help of “generally valid logical
laws” [Zermelo 1908b, 262]. Skolem [Skolem 1923] sharpened Zermelo’s
vague reference “generally valid logical laws,” by presenting Zermelo’s set
theory in a ﬁrst-order language and showing that the Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem also holds for Zermelo’s set theory. This theorem says that each
ﬁnite or countable inﬁnite set of statements of the ﬁrst-order logic which
has a model, has a countable model.
Zermelo had reﬁned his notion of deﬁniteness in 1929 without know-
ing of Skolem’s criticism [Zermelo 1929], but again he was countered at
once [Skolem 1930].
Zermelo’s paper on boundary numbers belongs to the context of Zer-
melo’s ﬁght against the “Skolemism,”17 i. e., any kind of ﬁnitism. It
is interesting to see that Zermelo opposed almost all foundational posi-
tions at that time. He particularly did not follow Hilbert’s move towards
metamathematics. In metamathematics Hilbert left his ontological and
epistemological neutrality and proposed a constructive or operative way
of founding mathematics which comes close to Brouwer’s intuitionism in
its restriction to ﬁnite operations. Zermelo, however, rejected any ﬁnitis-
tic approach to mathematics as expression of a “Skolemism” in set theory.
Alternatively he kept his idealistic approach, attempting to justify his
inﬁnite hierarchies of sets with the help of what he called a “logic of
the inﬁnite” ([Zermelo 1932a]; [Zermelo 1932b]), with the help of which
he wanted to counter the “shortcomings of any ‘ﬁnitistic’ proof theory”
[Zermelo 1932a, 87]. With this he became one of the early precursors of
modern inﬁnitary logic [Moore 1997].
4 Conclusion
In concluding, let me come back to my initial question about the reasons
for Zermelo’s resignation as expressed in his letter to Bernays of Octo-
ber 1941. It was the loneliness of the living legend increased by the fact
that in foundations he was out of the professional mainstream for many
years, due to his persistent illness, his scientiﬁc isolation, and his contin-
uing active interest in applied mathematics. He did not participate in
foundational debates during the period of heated controversies on logic
and the foundations of mathematics after the First World War. After
having entered the scene again, Zermelo did not succeed in turning the
prevailing debate characterized by its ﬁnitistic metamathematical spirit
17
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into the direction of his inﬁnitistic ideas. As the development from the
1950s shows, they were ingenious for their time, but came 20 years too
early.
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